2009

Winner 2009

Bushell, J., E. Mansur and C. Saravia. ‘Vertical arrangements, market structure and competition: an analysis of restructured US electricity markets.' American Economic Review, 2008, 98(1): 237-266. 


2009 Ballot

In July 2009, ACE asked the membership to cast its votes by e-mail. The list below contains the five papers, published from January through December 2008, that were shortlisted by the Steering Committee. The membership can cast maximum one vote. The papers are listed below with bibliographic information that will allow you to retrieve the papers. Due to copyright issues, we are unfortunately not able to provide you with copies of the papers directly.
The membership can vote at any time from the receipt of the e-mail and until (and including) Monday 7 September 2009. The winner will be announced at the annual conference in Berlin (26-27 November 2009) and the winner will be invited to present her/his paper. 


SHORTLIST OF FIVE PAPERS FOR 2009 AWARD

1. Al-Najjar, N.; S. Baliga; and D. Besanko, ‘Market Forces Meet Behavioral Biases: Cost Misallocation and Irrational Pricing.' Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 2008, Vol 39 (1): 214-237.

Experimental evidence.  Firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions.

2. Bushell, J.;, E. Mansur and C. Saravia. ‘Vertical arrangements, market structure and competition: an analysis of restructured US electricity markets.' American Economic Review, 2008, 98(1): 237-266.

Empirical, shows that vertical arrangements influence horizontal competition. 

3. Economides, N.; K. Seim and V. Viard. ‘Quantifying the benefits of entry into local phone service.' Rand Journal of Economics 39(3), Autumn 2008: 699-730.

Empirical, quantifies the benefits of local competition in telecoms. 


4. Grossman, G and E. Loi. ‘Parallel imports and price controls.' Rand Journal of Economics 39(2), Summer 2008: 378-402.

Theoretical, challenges orthodoxy that parallel imports hurts R&D. 

5. Hendricks, K.; R. Porter and C. Tan. ‘Bidding rigs and winner's curse.' Rand Journal of Economics 39(4), Winter 2008: 1018-1041.

Theoretical, explains why bidding rings in common value environments may not lead to efficient collusion.