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# The BritNed Judgment

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Annual ACE conference in Bologna

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*Presentation represents the views of the  
speaker*

# Overview

**Part I Overcharge approach**

**Part II Court approach to statistical significance**

**Part III Cartel inefficiency**

**Part IV Regulatory exemption (pass-on)**

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# Part I

# Overcharge approach

# Primary overcharge analyses put forward by the experts

## Econometrics vs margin comparison

### 1 Oxera approach—21.8% overcharge

- econometric overcharge analysis
- cost proxies to avoid relying on ABB's reported costs
  - requires larger dataset, and therefore included underground projects
- aim was to estimate an unbiased overcharge rather than predict prices precisely
- control for factors that change over time between cartel and post-cartel period such as demand
  - included other cartel projects to allow such controls to be included

### 2 Frontier approach—no overcharge

- simple comparison of BritNed project margin with gross margin of similar post-cartel submarine projects
  - minor adjustments to the reported margins to strip out costs that were not directly related to the project
- no other control for changes between cartel and post-cartel period

# Court's key relevant findings of fact

ABB's costs are reliable, and no changes between cartel and post-cartel period

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## ABB put forward a competitively constructed bid for BritNed

- *'the direct costs in relation to ABB's bid for the BritNed Interconnector were honestly and competently compiled with a view to putting forward a **competitive bid**'* (para. 435)
- *'margins added to direct costs, including contingencies for risks [...] would properly have been added'* (para. 266)



## No change in demand/capacity utilisation

- the Court accepted ABB's factual witness evidence that capacity utilisation remained broadly similar over time, with ABB expanding capacity as demand increased

# Challenges with the Court's findings

## ABB's costs unreliable, and demand important factor

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### Reliance on ABB's costs

- the Court found that ABB's costs for BritNed are competitive and reliable, except for X-inefficiency, but this could be adjusted
- suggests that the Court had an appropriate way to do this?
  - the Court applied a conservative adjustment given the uncertainty regarding the size of the X-inefficiency

### Controlling for demand

- ABB considered that capacity most important driver of margin—lots spare for BritNed
- demand increased at the end of the cartel period into the post-cartel
  - dispute was whether capacity increases kept pace—no data on capacity available
  - Oxera used a publicly reported proxy
- Court found that demand/capacity change is difficult to model—prefers no control to proxy
- 'Neither the time trend variable nor the order backlog [demand] variable ought to be fundamental to the operation of the model. If there is an overcharge, then it ought to be capable of being demonstrated in a statistically significant manner without these variables' (para. 418(1))

# Underground vs Submarine projects

Additional reason the Court rejected the econometric approach

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## Motivation

- Oxera included underground projects to increase the size of the dataset from 49 to 92
  - differences could be controlled for, and in any event overcharge was robust to inclusion
- model excluding underground projects produced a similar overcharge
- model with full interaction terms produced a similar overcharge

## Finding

- inappropriate and introduced additional unreliability in the model (para. 397)
- similar overcharge result from model excluding underground projects could be a coincidence
- some coefficients changed size, and some controls became insignificant for submarine only

## Challenge


- Court logic suggests overcharge is unreliable whether or not underground projects are included due to limited data available—is this consistent with the practical guide on quantifying harm?
- was it understood that halving the sample size is expected to affect standard errors?
- if there were differences, would a full interaction model not control for these?

## Part II

# Court's approach to statistical significance

# Confidence interval around overcharge estimate

## Econometric analysis



'size of the interval [...] an indicator that the model is not producing useful outcomes such that I can rely upon' (para. 418(3))

# Court's approach to statistical significance

## 5% statistical significance insufficient?

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
- null hypothesis = zero overcharge
- p-value gives the likelihood of estimated overcharge assuming that the true overcharge was zero
- p-value just under 5%—i.e. statistically significant at the 5% level
  - corresponding confidence level is 95%
  - lower end of 95% confidence interval will be close to zero
- Court found this is too uncertain—implies a tighter 95% confidence interval is required
  - 5% statistical significance threshold (two-sided) insufficient?
  - 1% threshold required? 0.1%?
  - presumption of harm? balance of probabilities?
- all else equal, statistical significance increases with sample size
  - more difficult to bring claims against cartels where a smaller dataset is available?

# Part III

## Cartel inefficiency


# Baked-in inefficiency adjusted margins analysis (I)

- Oxera identified the baked-in inefficiency based on ABB's losing bids
- ABB's post-cartel lost bids were on average more than 10% higher than winning bids for the most similar projects, for which the price was available in the public domain (and project scopes were the same)



# Baked-in inefficiency adjusted margins analysis (II)

- quantified the overcharge based on an adjusted margin analysis
  - adjusted margin calculated using ABB's costs, and the winning bid price—i.e. the margin that ABB would have earned if its price was the same as the winning bid
  - difference between BritNed margin and post-cartel margins informative of the level of X-inefficiency/overcharge on BritNed



# Part IV

## Regulatory exemption ('pass-on')

# Regulatory exemption ('Pass-on')

BritNed is entitled to recover all of, actually, 90% of the overcharge

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**Defence was originally rejected** (assuming that any damages awarded would be subject to the IRR Cap):

- excess profits do not benefit BritNed—must expand capacity or fund networks
- reasons of justice, fairness and public policy why cap argument should not enable a cartel to retain the overcharge
  - the Court considered that networks could not easily claim for an overcharge that they may incur in 2036—claim could vanish in 'some legal black hole'
- 'a court does not inquire into the use to which a successful claimant will put damages he, she or it has been awarded' (para. 537)
- BritNed should undertake to give the money back to ABB if damages not subject to IRR cap

## Revised judgment

- BritNed refused to provide the undertakings
  - refusal suggests to the Court that there is a risk of overcompensation that must be reflected in the award of damages
  - the Court reduced the damages by 10% to reflect the risk of over-compensation

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