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Each year ACE's academic group of the steering committee attributes an award for the best paper on competition economics. The first prize was awarded in 2008 (overview of past winners). The aims of the award are to promote research in competition economics and recognition for excellence both in theoretical and empirical analysis in this important area of economic policy and to encourage members to stay up to date with the best research.

Selection criteria and prize: 

Only papers published in the previous calendar year are eligible. Working papers are not eligible until properly published. Preference is given to publications in refereed journals, although publications in non-refereed journals are not excluded. Relevant elements for the selection are: potential contribution for formulation and actual implementation of competition policy, creativity and originality, and complexity of the matter under analysis. Papers co-authored by members of the Steering Committee of ACE are not eligible.The winner will be announced at the ACE annual conference, receives of 1000€, and is invited to present her/his paper at the conference, with travel and accommodation expenses paid by ACE. In case of a joint paper, the award will be split equally among the authors and they will be invited to designate one for attending the ACE annual meeting and presenting their joint work. 

AWARD FOR THE BEST PAPER ON COMPETITION ECONOMICS

Best Papers

WINNER 2023:

Daniel Knutsson, Björn Tyrefors (2022)

"The Quality and Efficiency Between Public and Private Firms: Evidence from Ambulance Service

Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(4), 2213–2262

WINNER 2022:

Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer, & Song Ma (2021)

"Killer Acquisitions"

Journal of Political Economy 129(3), 649-702

WINNER 2021:

Paul J. Eliason, Benjamin Heebsh, Ryan C. McDevitt, & James W. Roberts (2020) 

"How Acquisitions Affect Firm Behavior and Performance: Evidence from the Dialysis Industry"

Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1), 221-67

WINNER 2020:

Thomas G. Wollmann (2019)

"Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act"

American Economic Review: Insights 1(1), 77-94

WINNER 2019:

Gregory S. Crawford, Robin S. Lee, Michael D. Whinston, & Ali Yurukoglu (2018)
"The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets"

Econometrica 86(3), 891-954 

WINNER 2018:

Nathan Miller & Mark Weinberg (2017)
"Understanding the price effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture"

Econometrica 85(6), 1763-1791 

WINNER 2017:

Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer (2016)

"Nonlinear pricing and exclusion: II. Must-stock products"

RAND Journal of Economics 47(3), 631-660

Conference slides

WINNER 2016:

Michael D. Grubb (2015):
"Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation"
Review of Economic Studies 82(1), 219–257

WINNER 2015:

Jason Allen, Robert Clark, & Jean-François Houde (2013)
"The Effect of Mergers in Search Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Industry
American Economic Review 104(10), 3365-3396 

Conference slides

WINNER 2014:

Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolo (2013)
"Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts"

American Economic Review 103(6), 2384-2411 

Conference slides

WINNER 2013:

Zhijun Chen & Patrick Rey (2012)
"Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice"

American Economic Review 102(7), 3462-3482

Conference slides

WINNER 2012:

Andrei Hagiu & Bruno Jullien (2011) 

'Why do intermediaries divert search?"

RAND Journal of Economics 42(2), 337-362 

WINNER 2011:

John Asker (2010)

"A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel"

American Economic Review 100(3), 721-762  

WINNER 2010:

Kenneth S. Corts & Lara Lederman (2009) 

"Software exclusivity and the scope of indirect network effects in the US video game market"

International Journal of Industrial Organization 27(2), 121-136 

WINNER 2009:

James B. Bushell, Erin T. Mansur, & Celeste Saravia (2008) 

"Vertical arrangements, market structure and competition: an analysis of restructured US electricity markets"

American Economic Review 98(1), 237-266 

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